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Section I: Introduction 
Approximately four trillion dollars and 143 currencies trade daily in the foreign 
exchange market, making it the largest market of the world (Monetary and Economic 
Department, 2010; Frangos, 2010). Sometimes there are crises in these markets. The goal 
of this thesis is to explain currency crises and model how they move from country to 
country producing what economists call contagion. I will discuss a case study and use a 
cellular automata model to explain and model currency crises and contagion.  
The foreign exchange market consists of a series of banks and their traders who 
conduct foreign exchange trades with their customers and each other. The trading with 
customers is the retail part of the market and the trading between the banks is called the 
interbank market (Pugel, 2009, p. 401, 403). In the foreign exchange market, the U.S. 
dollar is the most actively traded currency in the world followed by the euro, the Japanese 
yen and the pound sterling in fourth place (Bank of International Settlements, 2007).
 One reason individuals, businesses and other organizations use the foreign 
exchange market and trade currencies is to enable them to interact with other individuals, 
businesses or organizations that use different currencies. For example, a firm in China 
that purchases an airplane from a U.S. producer can contact its bank and request 
quotations for selling yuan and obtaining dollars in the spot market, (which allows trades 
at today’s price) because the U.S. producer will only take payment in U.S. dollars. 
However, 40% of foreign exchange trading is trading among the banks themselves in the 
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 interbank part of the foreign exchange market (Pugel, 2009). People also speculate in the 
currency markets. Speculators make trading decisions based on signals of the future 
economic conditions that affect exchange rates in order to benefit from changes in the 
value of currencies (Madura, 2008). In addition, many international trades are in the 
futures market for exchanges sometime in the future, either to eliminate risks—to lock in 
a price today, for a necessary transaction in the future—or to speculate that the future 
spot price will be different than today’s futures price.  
The price of a currency is greatly influenced by its exchange rate system. In 
general, there are two kinds of exchange rate systems: fixed and floating. In fixed 
exchange rate systems officials declare a narrow “band” of exchange rates within which 
the rate is allowed to vary (Pugel, 2009, p. 410). On the other hand, floating exchange 
rate systems price currencies based on the interaction of private demand and supply for 
currencies.  
Today most countries have floating exchange rates, but that was not the case 40 
years ago. After World War II, world leaders met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to 
create a fixed exchange rate system in order to promote trade (Lewis, 2007, p. 240). The 
crippled global economies left after WWII needed to start trading to come out of their 
economic and financial problems. Fixed exchange rates encouraged trade because they 
eliminated uncertainty about the prices of goods purchased from and sold to other 
countries. However, in the 1970s most countries gradually switched to floating exchange 
rates from fixed exchange rates (Bhandari, 1985, p. vii). Different economic conditions in 
the different countries that did not sync up with supply and demand necessary to maintain 
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 the fixed exchange rates forced countries to go to floating exchange rates. Today, 
sometimes governments intervene to manage supply and demand and influence exchange 
rates. In addition, there are still some countries that have fixed exchange rates between 
their currencies and the U.S. dollar or the euro.  
Looking at the daily newspaper postings of exchange rates, it is easy to see that in 
the short run floating exchange rates are highly volatile and it is difficult to understand 
why they change as they do. Economists explain exchange rate changes using supply and 
demand. There are three main factors that influence the value of an exchange rate: 
inflation, interest rates, and economic growth.  
To illustrate how these factors influence demand and supply take for example the 
value of the dollar relative to the euro. U.S. consumers buy euros and sell dollars because 
they want to buy European goods, services, and assets, both financial and real. On the 
other hand, Europeans buy dollars and sell euros because they want to buy U.S. goods, 
services, and financial and real assets. If U.S. prices increase more than European prices, 
relatively higher inflation in the U.S., the demand for dollars decreases. This occurs 
because U.S. goods are now more expensive to Europeans and they buy fewer U.S. goods 
and fewer dollars, which leads to a depreciation of the dollar. If U.S. interest rates 
decrease relative to European interest rates, the U.S. dollar depreciates because 
Europeans demand fewer dollars. This occurs because investors are not interested in 
earning low returns on their investments. Similarly, if U.S. economic growth is slower 
than European economic growth, we expect a decrease in the demand for the dollar and 
thus depreciation of the dollar. A decline in the total economic output signals fewer jobs, 
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income and opportunities, which means less investment and consumption. In conclusion, 
the exchange rate value of a home currency rises in the short run when home prices rise 
relatively slower than foreign prices, when home interest rates rise relative to the foreign 
interest rates, and when an economy’s output is rising (Pugel, 2009, p. 443).  
Other than economic factors, another element that influences the value of a 
currency is speculation. Speculators can also drive exchange rate changes purely by 
expecting a future spot rate that is different from the current futures prices (Pugel, 2009, 
p. 443). In the long-run economic fundamentals predict relationships based on underlying 
forces that influence supply and demand. 
Even though the developed economies have floating exchange rate systems, 
emerging markets still fix their currencies to promote trade and send a signal that they
will have responsible monetary policy. To keep the exchange rate fixed, the central bank 
of the developing economy must replicate the monetary policy of the country to whose 
currency it’s fixed. For example, developing countries that fix their currencies to the 
dollar are sending a signal that they will replicate the U.S. Federal Reserve monetary 
policy. The two fixed currencies do not move relative to each other, but do move relative 
to other currencies. However, fixing a currency has its drawbacks.  
One of the major flaws of fixed exchange rate systems is currency crises. There 
have been 435 known currency crises across 195 countries from 1960 to 2006 (Pushan & 
Padmanabhan, 2009). These events produce levels of volatility in the currency and the 
economy, which cannot be controlled by policy makers in the affected economies. 
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Another problem is that these crises often spread from one country to another. 
Economists call this contagion (Pesenti & Tille, 2000). 
In the course of this thesis, I plan to explain and model currency crises and 
contagion. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section II provides a literature 
review of currency crises and contagion. Section III describes the case of currency crisis 
in East Asia. Section IV tells the story of Thailand before and during the crisis from the 
perspective of a typical news reader. Section V brings the reader to the present situation 
of the topic and Section VI tries to replicate the role of investors in these events using a 
cellular automata model. Section VII concludes.  
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Section II: Currency Crises and Contagion Literature Review 
Currency Crises
When “investors flee a currency because they fear that it might be devalued” a 
currency crisis, also known as an exchange-rate crisis or a currency crash, occurs 
(Krugman, 2000, p. 1). Capital flight forces devaluation and leads to a currency crisis. 
Over the period from 1960-2006, it is estimated that there were 435 currency crises 
across 195 countries (Pushan & Padmanabhan, 2009). Recent incidents of currency 
turmoil were evident in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992-1993, the Latin 
American Tequila Crisis after Mexico’s peso devaluation in 1994-1995, and the currency 
crisis in East Asia in 1997-1998 (Pesenti & Tille, 2000). Economists and academics agree 
in a broad sense on the nature of currency crises. 
One driver of currency crises is poor macroeconomic policy decisions (Krugman, 
2000). In this case investors perceive poor policy will lead to currency devaluation, as a 
result, governments often attempt to defend a fixed exchange rate by raising interest rates 
and/or intervening in the currency market. But often the cost of defense (slower economic 
growth) is greater than the cost of letting the currency float, so they abandon the defense. 
The classic “foreign-reserve driven” model says that speculation of currency devaluation 
leads to a depletion of foreign exchange reserves (Krugman, 2000). The depletion of 
foreign exchange reserves is due to the selling of foreign currency held in the central 
bank in order to purchase the domestic currency and ensure that their exchange rate does 
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 not fall below the fixed rate. Once the central bank runs out of foreign currency, it forces 
the central bank to give up its defense of the original parity (Krugman, 2000). Because 
investors know this, doubts can develop about the government’s willingness to defend the 
parity. 
Looking at the latest currency crises, Pesenti and Tille (2000) address the debate 
on what is truly causing currency and financial instability. They conclude both 
weaknesses in economic fundamentals and shifts in market expectations and confidence 
lead to crises. The first-generation, exogenous-policy models focus on the unavoidable 
result of unsustainable policies and fundamental imbalances unrelated to the actions of 
market participants (Pesenti & Tille, 2000). In this model “what matters for the analysis 
are the future policy stances that investors foresee” (Pesenti & Tille, 2000, p. 4). The 
second-generation, endogenous-policy models concentrate on the interaction between 
expectations and actual outcomes, in which market expectations directly influence 
macroeconomic policy decisions (Pesenti & Tille, 2000). Policymakers’ actions are a 
response to macroeconomic shocks created, on a large part, by market participants 
(Pesenti & Tille, 2000).  
A key point in the endogenous-policy models is the interaction between investor’s 
expectations and actual policy outcomes, which can lead to self-fulfilling crises. For 
example, if foreign investors consider the possibility of devaluation in a nation’s pegged 
domestic currency, they may begin charging a high-risk premium on their loans to that 
nation. The costs of borrowing increase significantly for the borrowing nation. 
Authorities may conclude that the costs of maintaining the currency pegged are too high 
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 and prefer to devalue the currency to ensure demand and employment. Thus, the 
devaluation occurred as investors expected, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy. This 
model though, does not describe what causes the shifts in investors’ expectations (Pesenti 
& Tille, 2000). 
After a currency crisis is created, they tend to manifest themselves in one or all 
the following forms. In the “macroeconomic policy-induced crisis,” the domestic credit 
expansion by the central bank is inconsistent with the pegged exchange rate which makes 
it an exogenous-policy induced crisis (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). This leads to a gradual 
decline in foreign exchange reserves because the central bank will directly intervene by 
using its reserves to buy the home country’s currency and prevent the further devaluation 
of their currency. However, the central bank becomes susceptible to an abrupt run, which 
drains the remaining reserves and drives the currency to a floating rate (Radelet & Sachs, 
2000). The central bank is susceptible to an abrupt run because market participants and 
analysts have high anticipation of crisis and may withdraw their investments and loans. 
There is the possibility of official intervention through macroeconomic adjustments such 
as monetary policy in the form of interest rates or fiscal policy in the form of budgetary 
reductions. Internally, the country will see a slowdown in economic growth, a rise in 
unemployment, and the possibility of deflation due to the government’s effort to place 
upward pressure on the currency’s value. 
In the endogenous-policy produced “financial panic” crisis, short-term creditors 
suddenly withdraw their loans requiring a lender of last resort (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). 
The panic occurs because short-term debts exceed short-term assets. Because no single 
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private market creditor is large enough to supply all of the credits necessary to pay off 
existing short-term debts, there must be an institution that will (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). 
Additionally, it becomes rational for creditors to withdraw their investment when other 
creditors are doing the same thing. In terms of currencies, a financial panic signifies a 
decrease in the demand for financial and real assets in the affected economy, thus a 
decrease in demand for its currency, which leads to a depreciation in the currency’s 
value. 
A “bubble collapse” crisis, also endogenous-policy induced, occurs when 
speculators buy a financial asset, such as stocks, bonds, or currencies, at prices higher 
than fundamental values in the anticipation of a successive capital gain (Radelet & Sachs, 
2000). In this event, participants are aware of the existence of a bubble and a probability 
that it might collapse (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). Official intervention can delay the 
bursting of a bubble, but this may lead to a deeper crisis later (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). 
The creation of the bubble in a country requires investors to demand the currency of the 
nation, increasing the value of assets dramatically due to over-optimism. But when the 
bubble bursts, asset prices decline and the currency is at a risk of collapsing due to the 
dramatic decrease in demand for the currency.
The “moral hazard crisis” is an outcome of unstable policy. In this crisis banks 
borrow excessive amounts of money on the basis of public guarantees of bank liabilities 
rather than fundamental values, which prolongs the misallocation of resources (Radelet & 
Sachs, 2000). Sometimes banks use these funds in an overly risky or even criminal 
manner (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). However, the majority or all creditors are protected by 
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explicit or implicit guarantees (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). Nevertheless, there is high 
anticipation of crisis by market participants and analysts (Radelet & Sachs, 2000). So any 
sign of crisis leads to capital flight.
Contagion 
A unique feature of the 1990s crises listed in the introduction of this section, is 
their spillover across several neighboring countries, a phenomenon referred to as 
contagion. Haile and Pozo (2008) define contagion as the likelihood of significant 
economic changes in one country spreading to other countries; this can be either 
economic booms or economic crises. In other words, contagion is “the spread of market 
disturbances—mostly on the downside—from one country to the other, a process 
observed through comovements in exchange rates, stock prices, sovereign spreads, and 
capital flows” (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000, p. 177). More specifically, Krugman 
(2000) proposes that currency crisis contagion is “the way that a crisis in one country 
seems able to trigger a crisis in another, even when the economic links appear to be
minor” (p. 4). Haile and Pozo (2008) point out the need to find out how crises spillover 
across countries to find solutions for crisis prevention, management, and resolution. 
The channels of crisis transmission or contagion are many. Calvo and Reinhard 
(1996) first coined the term “fundamentals-based contagion” which focuses on spillovers 
that result from the normal interdependence among market economies (as cited in 
Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000). The fundamental causes of contagion include 
global shocks such as major economic shifts in industrial countries and changing 
commodity prices (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000). A major economic shift in an 
10 

 industrialized nation, for example an increase in the value of the U.S. dollar, can lead to a 
crisis in an emerging economy pegged to the dollar and transmit the crisis to other 
developing countries also pegged to the dollar. This occurs because as the value of the 
U.S. dollar increases so does the value of the currency of the emerging economy. This 
makes the price of goods, services, and assets more expensive and affects many aspects 
of the economy that lead to a crisis.  
Another channel of transmission is trade links (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 
2000). Trade links refers to a common foreign trade transmission among a group of 
countries (Desai, 2003). Once a crisis has hit a country, any major trading partner of the 
country in crisis may experience a decline in exports to the crisis country, and a decrease 
in investment and capital inflows from this country. This in turns can affect the economic 
fundamentals of the trading partner. Due to these affects, any major trading partner may 
become susceptible to a speculative attack from investors, which produces the 
transmission of crises from country to country through trade links.  
Additionally, competitive devaluations, such as sharp currency devaluations cause 
contagion (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000). A country hit by a currency crisis 
experiences a drastic decrease in the price of its goods. This reduces the export 
competitiveness of any country the crisis nation competes with and puts a downward 
pressure on their currency. The competitive devaluation induces currency depreciations 
in other nations, transmitting the currency crisis that began in one country to other 
nations. Market participants also play a role in this channel of transmission. If market 
participants anticipate that a currency crisis in one country will lead to a game of 
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 competitive devaluations, they will sell their holding of securities of the competing 
countries, stop investing, or refuse to roll over short-term loans to borrowers in those 
countries (as cited in Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000).  
Financial links also cause contagion (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000). Any 
firms in countries linked in trade, investment, and financial transactions to the crisis 
country would be unfavorably affected. This occurs because a currency crisis limits the 
ability of the crisis country firms and investors to invest in other countries, extend credit, 
and reduces any other capital flows abroad.  Once a nation becomes a part of the global 
market, any financial disorder in that nation can affect other nations. As a result, a crisis 
in one country is reflected in other nations. 
Additionally, similarities across countries in macroeconomic policies and 
conditions, along with weakened fundamentals are causes of contagion (Desai, 2003; 
Eichengreen, Rose, & Wyplosz, 1996). These include similar monetary and fiscal 
policies, such as loose monetary and fiscal policy, and similar conditions such as inflation 
rates, GDP growth, and employment levels. If an emerging nation is experiencing a 
currency crisis, market participants will not only withdraw their funds from this nation, 
but also from nations that have similar macroeconomic policies and conditions. Investors 
make the rational conclusion that what is occurring in one country is likely to happen in 
another nation due to the macroeconomic parallels, and even more so when weak 
fundamentals are present. The withdrawal of funds from other nations provokes a crisis in 
those nations that may have not occurred or may not have occurred so soon. As a result, 
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 the speculative attack from investors is what makes similarities across countries in 
macroeconomic fundamentals a channel of crisis transmission. 
The spread of crises is further attributed to the behavior of investors or other 
financial agents. Investors’ behavior as a cause of contagion depends on the degree of 
financial market integration (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000). Countries that are 
closely integrated into the global or regional financial markets are susceptible to common 
shocks or real shocks from other countries. This occurs because asset prices and other 
economic variables impact each other as explained above in the case of an increase in the 
value of the U.S. dollar. Investors’ behavior can lead to contagion when investors decide 
to sell off securities due to liquidity and incentive problems (Dornbusch, Park, & 
Claessens, 2000). Incentive problems can be capital losses due to large declines in 
currency values which induce investors to pull out their investment (Dornbusch, Park, & 
Claessens, 2000). Investors also sell due to imperfect information and differences in 
investor expectations, sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence, and changes 
in the rules of the game (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000). In the case of the last 
event, investors fear that countries will create policies putting restrictions on foreign 
private creditors through capital controls which would prevent investors from converting 
their foreign currency investments back to their own home currency (Dornbusch, Park, & 
Claessens, 2000). All cases lead to sudden withdrawal of funds from countries with 
similar characteristics (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000). Further, common creditors 
may target banks in an infected country for fund withdrawal (Desai, 2003). Overall, 
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market participants’ perception of the economic outlook in countries with similar features 
is a transmission channel of currency crises (Pesenti & Tille, 2000).   
Due to imperfect information, there is a tendency of uninformed investors to 
follow the actions of the informed investors known as “herd behavior” (Dornbusch, Park, 
& Claessens, 2000). The tendency to herd increases as the number of investors and 
markets increases because it is more costly to stay informed. Thus following those most 
likely informed is the easiest strategy (Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000). This type of 
investor behavior reflects both rational and irrational behavior (Dornbusch, Park, & 
Claessens, 2000). Some investors may be aware of weak fundamentals in a market and 
rationally conclude that other markets with similar characteristics may face the same
problems. Those investors who decide to follow the informed investors due to lack of 
information, producing a cascading behavior, may be acting irrationally because they are 
unsure of why they are acting the way they are. During a financial crisis, investor
behavior is a key element in determining the potential for contagion across emerging 
economies (Dungey & Tambakis 2005, p. 17). This is true because the prices of financial 
assets are a result of their expected returns (Dungey & Tambakis, 2005). If the 
expectations of investors in different markets are in some way associated with one 
another, then an alteration in confidence in one market will extend to others (Dungey & 
Tambakis, 2005). The CA model in this paper focuses on this unique aspect of contagion 
along with neighborhood effects further explained in Section VI.  
Research has found empirical evidence of contagion. Analysts compare asset 
prices before and during crises in different countries. They have found that increases in 
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 asset prices are present in a set of countries before a crisis occurs. However, crises do not 
occur in all nations at the same time. Contagion is manifested in the correlation of 
variables such as interest rates and stock prices. This signifies that what happens in one 
country can be found in another country in a matter of days or weeks. 
Another evidence of contagion is shown by research on conditional probabilities 
which “involves estimating the probability of a crisis conditional on information on the 
occurrence of crisis elsewhere, taking into account fundamentals or similarities” 
(Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000, p. 187). It has been found that the likelihood of 
crisis is higher in a given country when there is a crisis in one or several other countries 
(Dornbusch, Park, & Claessens, 2000). 
Further empirical examination of contagion found that volatility spillovers show 
that cross-market movements in asset prices can cause contagion as well (Dornbusch, 
Park, & Claessens, 2000). Lastly, studies on capital flows show that contagion is 
transferred through the actions of portfolio investors: price increases encourage 
investment while price decreases reduce investment. Thus, findings show that buying 
current winners and selling current losers is stronger during crises (Dornbusch, Park, & 
Claessens, 2000). 
Additional research on contagion found that contagion tends to be regional rather 
than global because trade tends to be more intraregional than interregional. This supports 
evidence that contagion has been primarily a regional phenomenon as shown by the 
grouping of crises by continents or regions (Glick & Rose 1998; Haile & Pozo 2008). 
Other findings show that that the probability of contagion increases when the crisis is 
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 associated with the common creditor channel, which is borrowing from the same banks 
and institutions (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000). The probability of a crisis in a given 
country further increases as the number of its neighboring countries in crisis increases 
(Haile & Pozo, 2008). 
International financial regulators, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), react to crises, patching up the system once a 
crisis has hit (Dungey & Tambakis, 2005). There are though, a series of methods to 
prevent and contain crises. These are forms of capital account controls to regulate 
speculative flows. The first method involves coordinating the supervision of hedge fund 
activities (Desai, 2003). This would involve the temporary banning of their short selling 
of shares and would enforce greater transparency of their activities (Desai, 2003).  
Another form of prevention is to follow the Basel Committee standards (Desai, 
2003). The goal of the committee is to create stable global markets to prevent any drastic 
outflows and inflows of capital from any country (Desai, 2003). This committee provides 
authorities from nations a series of administrative standards and guidelines for banking 
supervision (Desai, 2003). Such guidelines require banks to maintain capital equal to at 
least four percent of their assets weighted by risk (Madura, 2008). Riskier assets require a 
higher capital ratio (Madura, 2008). The Tobin Tax is another method to regulate 
speculative flows (Desai, 2003). In 1971, Nobel Laureate economist James Tobin 
proposed a tax on transactions in currency markets (Desai, 2003). This tax would 
discourage short-term speculative inflows into a currency, with the goal of achieving 
international currency stability (Desai, 2003). 
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A form of containing and resolving a crisis is temporary debt repayment 
suspension (Desai, 2003). Debt suspension can “moderate the frequency of financial 
crises in emerging markets by placing the burden of debt restructuring on potential 
investors” (Desai, 2003, p. 274). Further, it will allow borrowers to raise the necessary
cash without lenders mandating payment immediately (Desai, 2003). Collection action 
clauses also attempt to resolve financial crises by allowing all bondholders to agree on 
debt restructuring and binding all holders (Desai, 2003). These clauses though, cannot 
prevent crises if creditors foresee financial problems with borrowers and decide to sell 
their assets bringing a crisis sooner (Desai, 2003). 
In order to prevent any type of contagious financial crises “countries may need to 
adopt regionally or globally coordinated measures” but it may also depend on the 
channels (Haile & Pozo, 2004, P. 573). Assuming that trade is a channel that spreads 
financial crises, countries may need to diversify their trade and/or fix their exchange rates 
within trading blocs (Haile & Pozo). If financial markets or activities are what spread 
financial crises, countries may need to impose capital controls and/or use a lender of last 
resort to neutralize the channel providing liquidity support (Haile & Pozo, 2008). 
Additionally, both debt composition and exchange rate flexibility limit the extent of
contagion (De Gregorio & Valdes, 2000). For example, if local developers and 
government borrow local currency at a fixed rate they are less likely to be impacted by 
changes in the foreign currency value and increasing interest rates. Further, allowing the 
local currency to float will enable economies to escape the contagion effect because they 
can avoid having to defend a fixed rate. 
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 Whatever the solution may be, during the 1990s emerging markets were being 
pressured by developed economies and financial regulators to avoid any form of capital 
controls (Desai, 2003). Today, the IMF recognizes that restrictions on capital inflows and 
outflows prepare a country for less damage in case of a crisis (Gjelten, 2010). 
Additionally, in the years after the currency crashes of the 1990s, the roles of the IMF, 
World Bank, and regional development banks were reformed by the Meltzer Commission 
(Desai, 2003). The Meltzer Commission was formed in 1998 by the U.S. Congress 
(Desai, 2003). The reforms include the creation of feasible and effective infrastructure 
and services that would permit market solutions and reduce the severity of financial 
crises (Desai, 2003). The commission expected fewer crises, and less moral hazard 
(Desai, 2003). 
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  Section III: East Asian Crisis
From the summer of 1997 to the middle of 1998, five Asian countries experienced 
currency crises. What began in Thailand spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and 
Philippines and to other continents as well. Economists and academics study this event to 
determine the causes of the crisis and the reasons for contagion.  
Prior to the East Asian Crisis, Asian countries were achieving unbelievable 
economic growth through advances in technology and economic improvement. Countries 
including China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and South Korea, had “strong macroeconomic fundamentals of high growth 
and low inflation rates, high savings and investment rates, and low to nil budget and 
current account deficits in the years before the onset of the crisis” (Desai, 2003, p. 9). 
There are however, a few significant differences in macroeconomic conditions between 
the countries. For example, prior to July 1997, Thailand was one of the of the world’s 
fastest growing economies, had low inflation rates, along with high savings and 
investment rates, but it also had one of the highest current account deficits (Desai, 2003). 
Table 3.1 illustrates the specific economic indicators of Thailand along with those of the 
countries in the region. 
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Table 3.1 
Macroeconomic Indicators for East Asian economies: 1991-1996
Country Growth rate (%) 
Inflation 
rate (%) 
Saving 
rate
Investment 
rate
Current 
account 
balance 
(% of GDP) 
Indonesia 8.67 7.82 29.64 32.44 -2.8 
Malaysia 8.65 4.20 31.21 38.99 -7.78 
South Korea 7.40 5.99 34.81 37.01 -2.20 
Philippines 2.80 10.13 18.34 22.64 -4.30 
Thailand 7.99 4.98 33.86 41.06 -7.20 
China 11.38 12.30 39.65 39.04 0.61 
Hong-Kong 5.27 8.74 33.15 30.40 2.76 
Taiwan 6.48 3.64 27.91 23.68 4.20 
Singapore 13.35 2.36 49.05 34.79 14.25 
Note. From Desai (2003), annual averages for 1991-1996. 
Macroeconomic indicators for the different countries in Asia from 1991 to 1996, 
demonstrate the state of the economies before the crisis. Table 3.1 shows that the average 
annual growth rates for the Asian economies during this period range from 5 to 13 
percent, excluding the Philippines. All of the countries, except for China, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Hong-Kong, exhibit relatively low single-digit inflation rates. 
Additionally, the saving rates are high, ranging from 18 to approximately 50 percent of 
gross domestic product. The investment rate for the first five countries, which is higher 
than domestic saving, shows foreign capital inflows supporting the growth of these 
nations. The negative current account balances for the first five nations, for example 
Malaysia and Thailand, who post current account deficits of 8 and 7 percent in 1996, 
meant more borrowing from abroad to finance the deficit.  
20 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the period from 1990 to 1996 the exposure to foreign borrowing for the 
Asian countries led to large foreign debts for some of them. Table 3.2 on the following 
page shows the changes in critical variables between 1990 and 1996. It shows a rise in 
the foreign debt of Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand. The table also shows a rise in 
foreign short-term debt as a percentage of total debt, and as a percentage of foreign 
exchange reserves for Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand. Foreign short-
term borrowing amounted to almost one quarter of bank loans to the private sector for 
Indonesia, South Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. The rates of foreign short-term debt to 
money supply were excessively high for the first five nations, excluding Malaysia. In 
contrast, China, Hong-Kong, Taiwan and Singapore maintain stability of total foreign 
debt as a percentage of GDP during the same period. Foreign short-term debt as a 
percentage of total debt fell for Hong-Kong and Taiwan, and as a percentage of foreign 
exchange reserves it fell for China and Hong-Kong to 24 and 14 respectively. China, 
Hong-Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore maintained low short-term borrowing rates and rates 
of foreign short-term debt to money supply, excluding Hong-Kong in the latter.    
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Table 3.2 
Foreign Debt in East Asian economies, 1990 and 1996 
Country 
Indonesia 
Total 
Foreign 
Debt (% of 
GDP)
66--57 
Foreign 
short-term
debt (% of 
total debt)
16-25 
Foreign 
short-term
debt (% of 
foreign 
exchange 
reserves) 
149-177 
Foreign 
short-term
debt/bank 
lending to 
private 
sector (%) 
21-26 
Foreign 
short-term
debt/money 
supply (%) 
86-146 
Malaysia 
South Korea 
36-40 
14-28 
12-28 
31-50 
10-41 
72-203 
6-12 
8-23 
10-35 
48-141 
Philippines
Thailand 
69-50 
33-50 
15-19 
30-57 
152-79 
63-107 
52-20 
15-23 
116-89 
110-246 
China 16-16 18-18 67-24 3-3 7-7 
Hong-Kong 
Taiwan 
16-16 
10-10 
46-28 
88-68 
24-14 
22-22 
4-4 
10-5 
48-64 
22-15 
Singapore 10-10 17-17 2-2 2-2 8-8 
Note. From Desai (2003), estimates are put together from IMF and Corsetti et al. (1998), 
Radelet and Sachs (1998), Wade (1998), and Wong (1998) 
Overall, the data represents the fundamentals of the East Asian economies 
through macroeconomic indicators and measures. Gross domestic product (GDP), along 
with growth, inflation, savings, and investments rates, and the economy’s current account 
deficit, in relation to GDP, are common economic indicators. The macroeconomic 
measures, such as the ratios of external debt to GDP and money supply, and export 
earnings to total debt, are measures affecting the health of the economy’s current account 
balance. Both indicators and measures reflect a country’s potential to continue growing 
while meeting its external debt obligations.  
The variables are important because they demonstrate the potential threats of 
domestic fiscal imbalances. Sizable current account deficits, as evident in Thailand and 
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Malaysia, make a country more vulnerable to currency crises and speculative attacks 
(Pesenti & Tille, 2000). When countries are unable to generate the sufficient export 
earnings to cover the current account deficits this affects the viability of their exchange
rate system, which in the case of the Asian economies, was their ability to maintain a 
pegged exchange rate (Pesenti & Tille, 2000). When macroeconomic ratios are high, such 
as foreign short-term debt as a percentage of foreign exchange reserves and to money 
supply as demonstrated for some of the Asian economies in Table 3.2, it raises the 
probability that a government will have to apply an expansionary monetary policy. An 
expansionary monetary policy with a fixed exchange rate regime leads to a depletion of 
foreign reserves due to the defense of the exchange rate peg (Pesenti & Tille, 2000). The 
defense requires the central bank to buy home currency in order to maintain the pegged 
exchange rate. Due to the depletion of foreign reserves, the rate of domestic credit 
expansion is guaranteed to surpass the demand for the home currency (Pesenti & Tille,
2000). This then leads to the selling of domestic assets due to the decrease in yields 
(Pesenti & Tille, 2000). Domestic investors demand foreign currency to invest in foreign 
assets, which forces the domestic central bank to further reduce its foreign reserves 
(Pesenti & Tille, 2000). Every event ultimately leads to the depreciation of the domestic 
currency. 
With the macroeconomic indicators and measures as they were for the Asian 
economies prior to 1997, a crisis should have been expected for Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, and South Korea. Rates and ratios by 1996 were showing large 
debts and account balance deficits, nevertheless, banks and investors focused on growth. 
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 On the assumption that Thailand’s economy would maintain its soaring growth, banks 
made many risky loans. Commercial developers borrowed excessively without needing to 
prove that growth was feasible (Madura, 2008). To improve the country’s infrastructure, 
the government borrowed heavily (Madura, 2008). Lastly, corporations’ friendly 
relationship with banks, enabled them to capitalize on the growing economy without 
providing sufficient documentation to support their borrowing (Madura, 2008). Massive 
borrowing, along with the large inflows of capital, made Thailand susceptible to collapse. 
This is exactly what happened. In July 1997, foreign investors recognized the baht’s 
potential weaknesses and decided to pull out their funds (Madura, 2008). This led to a 
huge increase in the supply of the Thai baht and a detachment from the dollar as foreign 
investors exchanged the baht for other currencies (Madura, 2008).  
The government in Thailand attempted to intervene to prevent the decline of the 
value of the baht. Using the reserves from the central bank, the government spent more 
than $20 billion purchasing the baht in the foreign exchange market (Madura, 2008, p. 
180). This direct intervention was an attempt to maintain the fixed exchange rate. 
However, the efforts were overwhelmed by market forces. A month later, the IMF and 
several other countries provided Thailand with $16 billion rescue package (Madura, 
2008). The package required a series of changes: reduction in the current account deficit, 
a cap on the inflation rate, and supervision of the local banks, along with other 
requirements (Madura, 2008, p. 181).  
Effects of the baht’s decline in value began to trickle to neighboring nations. 
According to Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) “Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand 
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 [were] heavily dependent on Japanese commercial bank lending; a crisis in one or two of 
these countries spread to all three” (p. 188). This demonstrates that having a common 
creditor was one of the channels of transmission for the crisis. In July, the value of the 
baht declined by more than 20 percent against the dollar (Madura, 2008). During that 
same month, and the next, the values of the Malaysian ringgit, Philippine peso, 
Taiwanese dollar, and Indonesian rupiah declined as well. This was due to their similar 
economic conditions: relatively high inflation rates, large inflow of foreign capital that 
was inappropriately invested, and excessive loans (Madura, 2008). Consequently, the 
similarities led investors to realize that Thailand’s crisis could also hit the other countries 
in Southeast Asia, and they decided to liquidate their investments (Madura 2008). The 
withdrawal of foreign investment further weakened the currencies because of the increase 
in supply and decrease in demand of their currencies.  
Loans to corporations played a substantial role in the Asian crisis. Corporations 
borrowed money in foreign currencies and were unable to pay them back due to the 
substantial decline in their home currencies. For example, in South Korea, seven 
conglomerates collapsed due to $52 billion in bad debt (Madura, 2008). The strategy to 
borrow in foreign currencies, due to the lower interest rates compared to home countries, 
backfired on many Asian corporations. The weakening of the home currencies forced 
corporations to exchange larger amounts of their currency for the currencies needed to 
pay off the loans. At the end of the day, corporations incurred a much higher effective 
financing rate—the actual cost of financing—than they would have paid if they had 
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 borrowed funds locally. The higher borrowing cost was added damage to the corporations 
(Madura 2008). 
According to Desai (2003) Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and South 
Korea, were more crisis prone than China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. The first 
group, as shown by the data in Table 3.2, maintained massive short-term capital inflows 
in relation to foreign exchange reserves, which led to disproportional loans to domestic 
borrowers and an increase in money supply (Desai, 2003, p. 9). For example, during the 
crisis and within a nine-month period, the value of the Indonesian rupiah declined by 
more than 80 percent against the dollar (Madura 2008). Investors and businesses in these 
five countries sold the local currency because of expectations of further decline. These 
actions perpetuated the weaknesses, as the exchange of the currencies for other currencies 
placed more downward pressure on the value of the home currencies.  
Hong-Kong, China and Taiwan though, were crisis-immune due to successful 
intervention methods. Hong Kong’s stock market did decline by 10.2 percent on average, 
but the country maintained its pegged exchange rate to the U.S. dollar and increased 
interest rates to discourage investors from moving their funds out of the country (Desai, 
2003). Similarly, China was not inflicted by the Asian crisis because its government 
controlled most of the banks, maintained the value of the yuan against the dollar, and 
helped maintain interest rates relatively low for firms to obtain funding (Desai, 2003). 
Ultimately, Desai (2003) says that these countries were able to avoid the financial crisis 
because of the resistance, management, and limited exposure to short-term capital 
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 inflows. Similarly, Singapore bypassed the contagion because of its limited exposure to 
such inflows (Desai, 2003). 
After affecting the five Asian nations, the Asian financial crisis began spreading 
to Russia and Brazil because the crisis caused investors to reconsider investments in 
countries with similar risk profiles. In August 1998, investors lost confidence in the 
Russian ruble and began transferring their funds out of Russia (Madura, 2008). The 
withdrawal of short-term funds also impacted the Brazilian Real in the following year 
(Desai, 2003). The weak fundamentals in Russia and Brazil resembled those of the crisis-
prone East-Asian economies (Desai, 2003). 
According to Pesenti and Tille (2000), using a traditional model of currency 
crises, which is based on the idea that weak or unsustainable economic policies are the 
sole cause of exchange rate instability, is not sufficient in explaining the Asian currency 
crisis. To truly understand what caused the turmoil, it is necessary to look at the 
interaction between policy and volatile capital markets. This demonstrates that weak 
policies make “a country vulnerable to abrupt shifts in investor confidence” (Pesenti & 
Tille, 2000). Pesenti and Tille (2000) identify two additional factors that help explain the 
severity of the Asian crisis: “inadequate supervision of the banking and financial sectors 
in the affected countries and the rapid transmission of the crises through structural links 
and spillover effects among the countries” (p. 3). Closely regulating the banking and 
financial sectors, preventing bad loans, requiring transparent financial statements, and 
demanding accounting standards in the East Asian region would have created stronger 
policies. These types of policies could have prevented the weak fundamentals that led to 
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 the abrupt shifts in investors’ confidence. Investors had invested large amounts of money 
into the Asian economies until the middle of 1997. At that moment, investors decided to 
reverse the pattern by withdrawing their funds at an unbelievable pace (Pesenti & Tille, 
2000, p. 3). 
Currency crises demonstrate how integrated economies are. In the case of the East 
Asian crisis, the problem began with weak fundamentals. The five major economies hit 
by the crisis allowed rapid capital inflow, risky lending by banks, and large foreign debts. 
A sudden shift in market expectations and confidence began in Thailand, triggered a 
crisis, and spread to neighboring countries. The channels of the East Asian crisis include 
financial links, similarities in macroeconomic conditions, and the market participants’ 
perception of the economic outlook in these countries based on the similarities. Investors 
ultimately believed that the central banks would be unable to prevent the fall in the 
currency values, so they transferred their funds and created a greater downward pressure 
on the value of the currencies. This crisis demonstrates the results of poor 
macroeconomic policy decisions that spread across countries and ultimately continents.  
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 Section IV: The Story of Thailand 
Over a decade of study of the East Asian Crisis gives economists and academics a 
clear theoretical conclusion to what occurred in the region. The theoretical perspective 
however, is not exactly what occurred in the streets and what was reported in the news. 
This section narrates the story of Thailand prior to and during the crisis to focus on the 
factors that led to this event and the damage it produced for the nation. 
Months before the crisis hit Thailand, the country experienced a mixture of 
growth and the beginnings of a downturn. For example, in June of 1997, Goldman, Sachs 
& Co. decided to invest $31.1 million in a Thailand-based hotel chain (Goldman, 1997). 
Less than five days later, Chevron Corp. announced a $1 billion joint venture with 
Petroleum Authority of Thailand for an aromatics facility (Chevron, 1997). Much of this 
major investment was driven by a new consumer attitude in the country. For example, 
during the previous five years, the “global MTV generation,” composed of teenagers and 
young adults, developed in all emerging markets of the world (as cited in Wysocki, 
1997). In Thailand in particular, by early 1997, companies such as Viacom Inc.’s MTV 
Networks, Citibank, and Levi Strauss & Co. capitalized on the new consumer attitude and 
spending power of the youth market (Wysocki, 1997). The youth market spent $150 on 
monthly cell phone bills, wore $75 jeans, and 98% of them were fans of MTV (Wysocki, 
1997). In the construction sector, the building boom of the ten years from 1987 to 1997, 
left cities such as Bangkok filled with office and apartment buildings, golf courses, 
shopping malls, and entertainment centers (Mydans, 1997).  
29 

  
 
The tremendous growth came with a cost. The new investments in the country 
from outside investment reduced the stake of many domestic owners. The large spending 
of young adults through credit cards left parents with large debts (Wysocki, 1997). And 
the lenders that financed the construction expansion ended up holding bad loans.  
As soon as the country realized its large debt, intervention began. The country 
began rescuing financial companies starting with the Bangkok Bank of Commerce in the 
summer of 1996, which cost taxpayers approximately $3 billion (Learning, 1997). In 
order to protect depositors in Thailand’s finance companies, in June of 1997 the 
government forced 16 of the weakest finance companies to merge with larger financial 
corporations or suspend operations (Wong-Anan, 1997). Nevertheless, debt was not the 
only issue affecting the nation. 
Prior to letting its currency float in July 1997, Thailand had not truly publicized 
the bad news (Sherer, 1997b). The borrowing streak of the previous decade was not 
managed properly and the consequences were already evident. Approximately 10,000 
Thais were laid off from textile and footwear factories in early 1997 (Sherer, 1997b). 
Companies began shortening work weeks and cutting hours (Sherer, 1997b). The slow
auto market in the country forced manufactures of Mitsubishi vehicles to terminate 
employees and cut back production of vehicles for the domestic market while increasing 
that for the foreign market (Mitsubishi, 1997). Fear kept building among many Thais as 
the growth rate of 1996 fell to 6.7 percent from the eight percent averages of the previous 
few years, and projections for 1997 were even lower (Mydans, 1997). Asian authorities 
had been paying attention to these events and began worrying about financial debt.  
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 To assist with the current situation, in the middle of June of 1997, the government 
appointed a new finance minister. Thanong Bidya won cabinet approval after previous 
Finance Minister, Amnuay Viravan, resigned (Mydans, 1997). Mr. Bidya promised to 
revive the financial system by repackaging property loans and merging financial 
companies but there was no mention about floating the currency (Mydans, 1997). 
Nevertheless, popular press was and had been speculating about the abandonment of the 
dollar peg since the beginning of 1997. It is evident that Thai companies were paying 
really high interest rates in order for the country to keep its currency policy (Sherer, 
1997a). A devaluation of the baht would boost exports and allow the country to lower its 
interest rates but would hurt companies with large foreign debt (Sherer, 1997a). One local 
finance executive predicted that by either letting the baht float or allowing greater daily 
fluctuations, the currency would depreciate at a really fast rate (Sherer, 1997a). Other 
analysts opposed a devaluation of the baht by either method and were convinced that with 
the current system devaluation was unlikely (Sherer, 1997a). Rumors of the devaluation 
of the baht caused the stock market to fall sharply. For example, shares of company 
Finance One PCL, Thailand’s largest finance company, dropped 71% to 28 cents in the 
first week of June (World, 1997). The central bank however, denied any rumors of a 
change in their exchange rate system (Sherer, 1997a).  
The rumors however became true. On July 2, 1997, Thailand’s government 
allowed the baht to float (Thailand, 1997). Prior to this, the baht was pegged to a basket 
where the U.S. dollar counted for eighty percent, and the German mark and Japanese yen 
made up the rest (Sherer, 1997a). The baht was only allowed to fluctuate to plus and 
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minus two cents to the dollar on a daily basis (Sherer, 1997a). But the cost of the basket 
peg became too painful, and the government hoped that by allowing the baht to float, the 
country could worry about healing the economy instead of defending its currency. It was 
the financial pressure that forced Thailand to float its currency because the government 
could no longer bear the costs of supporting it (Lifebelts, 1997).  
For months the central bank had to battle with currency speculators in order to 
maintain the pegged value of the baht. For example, in May traders sold billions of baht 
short, betting that it would decline in value (Sesit & Jereski, 1997). In a short sale a party 
borrows assets from a second party, sells it to a third party, and plans to purchase the 
same assets at a later date to return to the lender. The short seller hopes the price of the 
assets decreases to purchase the assets at a cheaper price and gain from the sale. If the 
price of the assets increases though, the short seller incurs a loss. Hedge funds run by 
George Soros’ lieutenant Stan Druckenmiller, Julian Robertson, and Bruce Kovner, along 
with trading operations at dealers such as BZW, J.P. Morgan & CO., and Goldman Sachs 
along with others, sold short large amounts of baht because it puts downward pressure on 
its value. As a result, they planned to replace the borrowed currency at a cheaper price
(Sesit & Jereski, 1997). However, the Thai government and other Asian central banks 
joined forces and spent approximately $12 billion buying baht and selling dollars (Sesit 
& Jereski, 1997). Additionally, the Bank of Thailand ensured a reduction in the supply of 
baht available to all speculators by preventing local banks and branches in the country 
from lending baht to foreigners (McDermott, 1997; Sesit & Jereski, 1997). In the end, the 
big traders did not receive the returns they expected (Sesit & Jereski, 1997). The central 
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 bank had won this battle, but the country would no longer be able to continue these 
interventions.  
The switch in the exchange rate system gave the country something new to worry 
about, the fall in the baht’s value. The baht fell from four cents per baht to three cents per 
baht on the first floating date (Thailand, 1997). In order to avoid a steeper decline, the 
government raised its discount rate two percentage points to 12.5% and left exchange 
controls in effect in an effort to maintain foreign investment (Thailand, 1997; Lifebelts, 
1997). Companies were quickly hurt by the floating of the baht due to the increase in 
borrowing costs and record foreign-exchange losses (Holman, 1997). As a result, the 
government provided $698 million in loans to these companies (Holman, 1997).  
Only eight days after the currency began floating, The Economist compared 
Thailand to Mexico. In 1994, the Mexican peso experienced a dramatic collapse in its 
value which drove the economy into a catastrophic downturn. The IMF and other 
developed economies provided Mexico with a $40 billion bail-out loan due to its weak 
fundamentals and depletion of foreign reserves (Lessons, 1997). Journalists were 
commenting that Thailand might need a bail-out of its own (Lessons, 1997). The 
government however, said it would not seek any credit lines provided by the IMF or other 
countries. Eventually, as mentioned in Section III, the IMF and countries such as the U.S. 
gave Thailand a $16 billion rescue package (Madura, 2008). 
In order to help Thailand, banks in Japan decided to continue lending in the 
country. There were thousands of Japanese manufacturers located in Thailand. Any 
withdrawal of investment by the Japanese could further hurt the baht, which could further 
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affect the Japanese manufacturers (Sapsford, 1997). The economic turmoil did force 
some Japanese auto makers to close factories, reduce production, and terminate jobs of 
workers in Thailand (Shirouzu, 1997).  
As Thais became more conscious about the situation, they decided to change their 
consumer habits. The norm became to “‘buy-Thai-eat-Thai’” (Utumporn, 1998). As a 
result, companies like McDonald’s advertised exporting products in order to help the 
economy (Utumporn, 1998). The new marketing strategy was an effort to maintain 
customers and present a patriotic image of the company.  
Despite intervention by the government and the people, the baht continued falling 
and closed the year at two cents per baht (Historical, 1997).  
Figure 4.1: Thailand’s Daily Exchange Rate Values, 7/1/96-10/31/98
From Oanda.com: Historical Exchange Rates (1997) 
Figure 4.1 shows the exchange rate of Thailand prior to the change in currency system 
and the values of the floating rate up to the fall of 1998. After July 2nd, 1997, the figure 
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shows the drastic fall in U.S. dollar per baht. Until the first month of 1998, the baht did 
not see any significant increase in its value. Even so, through the first three quarters of 
that year, the baht was not close to reaching the pegged value it once maintained.  
While Thailand experienced these events, so did four other East Asian economies. 
The daily percent change of the exchange rate values of the Malaysian ringgit, Philippine 
peso, South Korean won, and Indonesian rupiah demonstrate similar behavior to the 
exchange rate values of Thailand, which is evidence of currency crisis contagion. 
Figure 4.2: Daily Percent Change of Exchange Rate Values in Five 
East Asian Nations, 7/1/96-10/31/98 From Oanda.com: Historical 
Exchange Rates (1997) 
After Thailand allowed its currency to float on July 2nd, the Philippine peso came under 
attack on July 7th (Lifebelts, 1997). By July 10th, both the Indonesian rupiah and 
Malaysian ringgit weakened (Lifebelts, 1997). The South Korean won saw its most 
significant drop in October of 1997. Figure 4.2 visualizes the fall in the value of the 
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 exchange rates of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Indonesia as 
percent change in the summer of 1997. Thailand had the largest drops in exchange rate 
value, followed by South Korea. 
By the end of 1997 the devastation was in the five nations. What was known as 
the Asian miracle ended in a catastrophic crisis that began in Thailand and quickly spread 
throughout Asia. Problems in the lending sector, stock market and with government 
policies all contributed to the creation of the crisis. Many Thais were left without jobs, 
with an oversupply of new buildings, and with a new national debt it would take years to 
pay off. 
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 Section V: Fast Forward to the Present  
The foreign exchange markets continue to be the largest markets of the world and 
crises are a part of these markets. Emerging economies such as Thailand, South Korea, 
the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, demonstrate the characteristics and economic 
conditions that lead to currency crises. Even though the major crises took place over a 
decade ago, the phenomenon of herd behavior and contagion are still an issue. Today, not 
only emerging economies but developed nations, including the U.S. and the European 
Union, are subject to capital movements in reaction to weak economic fundamentals. 
Governments, economists and analysts know the causes and have witnessed the 
consequences of currency crises. Nevertheless, countries are still unsure how to deal with 
problems of investor behavior manifested through capitals flows and changes in currency 
values. 
Banks and their traders, along with speculators, companies, and governments are 
using the foreign exchange market more than ever. The $4 trillion a day market attracts 
rich and poor investors alike (Lauricella & Kansas, 2010). Today, the foreign-currency 
market is more volatile (Levisohn, 2010). Markets are going up and down and investors 
are taking advantage (Levisohn, 2010). For example, in 2010, investors bet on the value 
of the dollar falling against currencies of emerging markets (Levisohn, 2010). They 
hedged against the falling dollar in 2010 because during the 2008 turmoil many people 
bought the safe haven dollar and now investors speculated people would sell dollars and 
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its value would weaken (Levisohn, 2010). Either way, investors are safe because they are 
able to buy insurance which allows them to sell and buy currencies at set prices 
(Levisohn, 2010). But that is not all they have done. 
Due to investors’ behavior, capital movements have taken a new turn. As a result 
of the global financial crisis of 2008, struggling, developed economies, such as the U.S., 
Europe, and Japan, decreased their interest rates to promote economic growth (Phillips, 
2008; Lauricella & Kansas, 2010; Hong, Shaw, & Fung, 2010; Talley, 2011a). Thus, 
investors around the world moved their money to poor, high-yield emerging nations to 
earn higher rates of return (Phillips, 2008; Lauricella & Kansas, 2010; Hong, Shaw, & 
Fung, 2010; Talley, 2011a). In the last two years, the inflow of money allowed 
developing nations to drive global growth. For example, in the first quarter of 2010, 
capital inflows into China increased to $95.9 billion, while investors bought $29 billion 
worth of shares in India (Batson, 2010; Frangos, 2011a). Countries such as China, Brazil, 
India, and sub-Saharan African countries are achieving four times the economic growth 
rates of rich nations (Talley, 2011a). The same nations hit by the East Asian crisis are 
receiving large inflows of money. For example, since the start of 2010, global investors 
bought $9.5 billion in Indonesian government bonds (Frangos, 2011b). Additionally, net 
portfolio funds into Thailand equaled $5.6 billion (Phromchanya, 2010). 
Nevertheless, emerging nations are now struggling to manage the vast inflow of 
money. In 2010, the money was necessary for growth. Now, most countries are stressed 
about inflation and the possibility of asset bubbles (Talley, 2011b). The continuous 
inflow of money has put upward pressure on the value of their currencies (Phromchanya, 
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2010). Strong currencies harm exporters and decrease the current account balance. This 
occurs due to negative net sales abroad as prices of domestic goods and services become
more expensive for foreign consumers leading to a decrease in demand for their products. 
Continuous inflows also make emerging economies susceptible to volatile capital 
movements and the possibility of financial disorder. The issue now is finding the best 
way to moderate the enormous capital inflows.
One solution to the problem is a new set of capital controls supported by the IMF, 
Institute of International Finance, and Asian Development Bank (Anonymous, 2010). For 
decades, the IMF had opposed the use of capital controls (Davis, 2010). In 2010, the 
international organization began suggesting the use of capital controls to regulate the vast 
inflows of capital to emerging nations to limit financial damage when the flows reverse, a 
change that has many shocked (Davis, 2010). Explicit taxes, requiring interest-free 
foreign capital to be held at the central bank, withholding taxes on foreigners’ 
investment, and taxes on short-term capital inflows are some restrictions that Brazil, 
Chile, Thailand, Malaysia and other countries have tried (Davis, 2010; Phromchanya, 
2010). However, economists agree that such methods are not long-term solutions 
(Phromchanya, 2010). 
Opponents of capital controls say restrictions on capital can drive the much 
needed investment to other countries, causing an appreciation of their currencies, and 
making exports less competitive internationally (Davis, 2010). They suggest strong 
fundamentals to protect an economy from external shocks rather than capital controls 
(Anonymous, 2010). Malaysia, for example, since imposing capital controls in 1998, has 
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 struggled to attract money into the country even after loosening many restrictions 
(Anonymous, 2010). An open capital market allows money to flow in when it’s needed 
for growth and flow out in times of crises (Anonymous, 2010). An open capital account 
is the “rule of law,” says an anonymous author in “Capital-Control Comeback” (2010). 
Nevertheless, Asian economies, such as Thailand and South Korea, learned from the 
1997 Asian crisis and decided to use tight regulations on capital and stockpiled foreign 
currencies to cover foreign-currency debts (Phillips, 2008; Anonymous, 2010). Despite 
these interventions, there is a possibility that history may repeat itself. 
Thailand, after facing a problem with a 13-year high value of the baht against the 
U.S. dollar, is now dealing with the withdrawal of foreign investment (Phromchanya, 
2010; Frangos, 2011a). Indonesian government bonds and Philippines peso bonds are 
being pressured by investors (Frangos, 2011a). For South Korea, the won floats freely 
which has led to frequent and sometimes wild changes in its value and the country is 
afraid that any form of intervention may lead to market uncertainty (Lee, 2010). For all 
emerging nations, the main issue now is inflation, which is causing investors to flee 
(Hookway & Phromchanya, 2011). But inflation is not the only issue, staying competitive 
is pressuring many nations to intervene in the currency markets due to China’s 
undervalued currency. 
The new global concern has become the manipulation of currencies. This is the 
case of countries such as China, South Korea, Brazil and Japan undervaluing their 
currency, an issue now known as “the currency fight” (Talley & Crittenden, 2010; 
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 Ramstad, 2010). Leading the manipulation is China and other countries are taking their 
own actions to stay competitive (Ramstad, 2010).  
China is driving the Asian region and the world through economic growth and 
large capital inflows, but its methods are being disputed by U.S. and European officials 
(Batson, 2010). The U.S. and particular European nations believe China is intentionally 
undervaluing its currency to increase exports (Ramstad, 2010). The developed nations are 
battling with China’s trade surplus and blame the country for the global trade imbalance 
(Ramstad, 2010). China argues the Yuan, officially the renminbi, cannot be susceptible to 
external forces because any fluctuation would bring disaster to China and the world 
(Ramstad, 2010).  
The case of China is a unique one. The country is currently facing masses of 
pressure from both developed and developing economies to appreciate the Yuan. But 
China climbed to a world power due to its tight regulations. The Chinese government is 
trying to assist its manufacturing sector by encouraging the consumption of manufactured 
goods by foreigners through a cheap currency. If the government allows an increase in 
the value of the Yuan, the country would lose its comparative advantage in the 
manufacturing sector, risk a rise in unemployment, hurt its economic growth and cause 
many companies to collapse (Wilson, 2010; “Rmb to,” 2011). In turn, this would lead to 
a slowdown in the global economic recovery. 
To deal with both capital controls and the manipulation of currencies, government 
officials hope a solution will be discussed in the 2011 Group of Twenty (G-20) meeting. 
The international organizations and all nations are aware that capital controls are 
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changing how the market works; it is a new direction for the foreign exchange markets 
(Hong, Shaw, & Fung, 2010). But there is a fear that financial regulators may not know 
how to truly place capital controls and reduce foreign money flows (Fidler & Hilsenrath, 
2011). As a result, the IMF is considering a set of guidelines for the use of capital 
controls (Talley, 2011b). If approved, countries who seek emergency loans from the fund 
are more likely to be subject to the new guidelines. The IMF is considering changing the 
basic bylaws to give it more power and authority to require a member to either remove or 
enact restrictions (Talley, 2011b). Either way, central banks are pushing the IMF to 
develop instructions for financial regulators to follow when dealing with capital controls 
(Fidler & Hilsenrath, 2011). 
Even more important than an increase in power of the IMF, is the current 
discussion among U.S. regulators about the foreign exchange market. As part of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which aims to regulate trading in all financial derivatives, U.S. policy 
regulators are considering requiring more reporting of trades and more transparency of
the financial instruments used in the foreign exchange market (Martin, 2011). Up to now, 
the currency market has been the most lightly regulated of all financial markets (Martin, 
2011). Neither foreign exchange derivatives nor the currency market are explicitly part of 
the Dodd-Frank Act (One Hundred Eleventh, 2010). Nevertheless, it has companies, 
investors, and banks worrying about the implications of such changes (Martin, 2011). As 
a result, in 2010 a new lobbying group representing banks in the foreign-exchange 
division of banking was formed to convince regulators in the U.S. and European Union 
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that foreign-exchange derivatives are different from other markets and should not be 
included in the act (Martin, 2011). 
In the last twelve months, capital controls, the manipulation of currency values 
and the foreign-exchange markets have become hot topics around the world. It is a fact 
that investors continue to play a major role in the global economy. Their actions can 
determine which countries grow and which do not. Will the G-20 meeting in November
be able to resolve all of these issues? One direction is clear, countries are moving away 
from the free movement of capital to controlling capital in an attempt to avoid currency
crises.
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Section VI: Modeling Herd Behavior and Contagion
This chapter presents a cellular automaton (CA) model simulating the complex 
dynamics of financial markets. Based on the “Majority Wins” rule, the “Financial 
Market” model modifies the behavior of a set of particular cells to imitate the behavior of
investors in any financial market. More specific for this thesis, the CA model replicates 
herd behavior creating a currency crisis and the transmission affect produced by 
investors. This CA model is based on investors’ interactions and uses simple rules for 
representing their behavior. 
Herd behavior is created by investors when “the optimal investment strategy 
regarding a specific country involves following the lead of the investor most likely to be 
informed of the prospects of that country” (Pesenti & Tille, 2000, p. 10). Thus the model 
uses two types of investors informed and uninformed. Informed investors are those 
investors who are informed of the nature of the country they are investing in. These 
investors pay attention to the economic indicators of a country, along with 
macroeconomic policies and conditions, changes in financial markets and financial 
incentives. The goal of the model is to demonstrate how the uninformed investors 
replicate the actions of the informed investors. Along with herd behavior, the model 
shows the transmission of a crisis from country to country by linking states, producing 
the contagion phenomenon.  
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Description of Model
The financial market is represented as a two-dimensional lattice. There are 10,000 
cells and every cell on the lattice represents an investor. Each investor has a random
neighborhood size as determined by a “square random small world” lattice (Bahr, 2008). 
The number of neighbors is defined by power-law distribution (Bahr, 2008). This 
distribution means that most cells have very few connections, uninformed investors, but a 
small number of cells have many connections, informed investors. The neighborhood 
connections are symmetric (Bahr, 2008). This means that if cell A is connected to cell B, 
cell B is also connected to cell A. All investors invest in a single country per generation. 
Generations represent time. A generation can represent a minute, an hour, a day, or any 
other unit of time. The state of the cells represents a country. 
Herd Behavior
Before modifying the behavior of the informed investors, the model runs as a 
“Majority Wins” model. In the “majority rule,” a cell makes its current opinion, or state, 
match the opinion of the majority of its neighbors (Bahr, 2008). In order to imitate the 
behavior of investors, the “Financial Model” rule includes specific instructions for 
informed investors. Informed investors make their current opinion, or state, based on 
financial factors. As previously stated, informed investors are the cells with the most 
number of neighbors. The cells with the most number of neighbors are also referred to as 
“opinion leaders” in this model. Their opinion is followed by its large number of 
neighbors, which are the uninformed investors. In order to find the informed investors, all 
the cells in the lattice are placed in an array, which is a static memory allocation. The 
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array is sorted, with the cell with the largest number of neighbors first, to the cell with the 
smallest number of neighbors last. 
This function of the model shows how the actions of one or a few informed 
investors can change the actions of the majority of investors, leading to a currency crisis 
in a country. In models, such as the “Obesity Model” and “Alcohol Model,” social force 
is used to manipulate the behavior of a cell (Bahr et al., 2009; Nowak & Lewenstein, 
1996). Social forces are external influences such as news, TV commercials, newspaper 
articles, government incentives, laws, etc. that will change behavior (Bahr, et al., 2009; 
Bahr, 2008). For the purpose of this model, the variables driving investors’ behavior are 
economic fundamentals, data releases, movements in financial markets, policy decisions 
and economic incentives. As a result, these variables grouped together will be called 
“Financial economic force.” Financial economic force is a measure between negative two 
and positive two. It is applied to each state individually. Sometimes a small change in
financial economic force can cause a drastic change in the behavior of investors (Nowak 
& Lewenstein, 1996). 
For example, using the “Financial Model”, a simulation with ten states, starting at 
approximately 1000 cells per state, is run for 500 generations without modifying any 
behavior. No behavior modification means the investors are using the “majority rule” to 
make their decisions. Once the “financial rule” is turned on, investors’ behavior is based 
on herding. One informed investor, with 231 neighbors, is given a financial economic
force of -0.024 at the 500th generation against state five, the state with the most number 
of cells. The following figure shows what happens to the state. 
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Figure 6.1: Herd Behavior One informed investor with 231 neighbors 
and -0.024 financial economic force against State 5, starting at the 500th 
generation 
The figure clearly shows the influence of one cell on the entire lattice. It 
demonstrates that a small change on the financial economic force can create drastic 
changes in behavior, such as driving all cells away from a state. Because the 
neighborhood configuration is different every time the simulation is restarted, the top 
informed investor does not always have the same number of neighbors. As a result, there 
are 50 trials of this simulation, in which the top informed investor is given a -0.024 
financial economic force against a particular state. On average, the leading state had 
2,647 cells at the 500th generation. A financial economic force of -0.024 to the top 
informed investor with an average neighborhood size of 199 cells was applied. This led 
to a decline of the top state to an average of 984 cells by the 2000th generation. 
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Contagion
In order to include contagion in the model, a certain number of states are linked. 
This represents a high degree of integration, because whatever happens to one state is 
replicated by the other states. For example, if investors stop investing in state zero, which 
is linked to states one, two, and three, the investors will also stop investing in those states. 
There are two ways this can be done.  
Version I
One way to include contagion in the model involves replicating state zero. If 
investors are moving away from state zero, they will also move away from the linked
states and vice versa. Using this version of the model, a simulation with ten states, 
starting at approximately 1000 cells per state, is run for 500 generations without 
modifying any behavior. At the 500th generation, using the top six informed investors and 
linking states one through four to state zero, state zero is given a financial economic force 
of negative one. The following figures show the results of the simulation at the 500th 
generation, 1000th, and 2000th. 
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Figure 6.2: Contagion at the 500th Generation No behavior modification 
for 500 generations
Figure 6.3: Contagion at the 1000th Generation Six informed investor 
with -1.0 financial economic force against State 0, at the 1000th generation 
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Figure 6.4: Contagion at the 2000th Generation Six informed investor 
with -1.0 financial economic force against State 0, at the 2000th generation 
The figures show how the force placed on the six informed investors against state 
zero produced a decrease in the number of cells for that state and the linked states. Figure 
6.2 clearly demonstrates that states zero through four have different percentages of cells 
by the 500th generation. As the financial economic force is applied to only one state, the 
rest of the states follow, producing contagion. Fifty simulations were run to test the 
influence of informed investors and the contagion effect. As the number of informed 
investors increases against state zero, the more the linked states act in concert and 
maintain a steady and equal percentage of the cells in the lattice. The next figure shows 
this event.
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Figure 6.5: Contagion Version I Fifty informed investor with -1.0 
financial economic force against State 0, for 2000 generations 
Version II
Within the “Financial Model”, another method of producing contagion involves 
looking at the change in volume of each state. In this version, the investors consider the 
change in the number of cells of the linked states individually, from the previous 
generation to the current generation. Once the investors determine whether the linked 
states volumes are increasing or decreasing, they choose whether to invest in those states 
or not. Different from Version I, the investors do not simply look at what is happening to 
one state, but what is occurring to the linked states as a whole. 
For example, suppose that a small group of informed investors decides to stop 
investing in state zero. For a couple of generations, the decrease in the volume of state 
zero will be significant enough to move the informed investors, their followers and the 
majority of the lattice from the linked states. Once the change in volume becomes 
51 

  
 
 
smaller, the informed investors will begin investing in the linked states again. The model 
thus forms oscillations, showing how the investors move from a group of linked states to 
unlinked states and back and forth. 
The following figure shows what happens to five states after they have been 
linked, states zero through four, with five informed investors with financial economic 
force of -0.512 against state four. 
Figure 6.6: Contagion Version II. Five informed investor with -0.512 
financial economic force against State 4
As the number of informed investors increases, the more the states move in 
concert and oscillations occur. The next figure shows the same modifications as Figure 
6.6 but with forty-five informed investors, instead of five, against state four. 
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Figure 6.7: Contagion Forming Oscillations. Forty-five informed 
investor with -0.512 financial economic force against State 4
Unintentionally, the model here shows a cycle similar to what occurs in real 
economics. For example, in the early 1990s, short-term debt of the five East Asian crisis 
nations was funded by the excessive foreign capital inflow. In 1997, investors decided to 
reverse the direction of their capital flows and the crisis occurred. For the last six years, 
the flow of capital has been reversed once again. Section V recounts how the flow of 
capital moved to developing nations during the global financial crisis. Today, emerging 
economies are struggling with the inflow of capital and discouraging investors from
investing. To illustrate the movement of capital, Figure 6.8 shows the trend of short-term
debt of the Eastern Asian countries. 
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Figure 6.8: Short-term Debt of Eastern Asian Countries (1980-2009).
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank, 2011, and author’s 
calculations for South Korea from Liu, W. (2007). 
Figure 6.8 shows a steady growth of foreign short-term debt from 1980 to 1994. 
From 1994 to 1996 these countries started borrowing excessively. In 1997, the countries 
collapse. Nevertheless, the figure shows a new growth of foreign short-term debt 
beginning in the 21st century for Thailand and Malaysia, quickly followed by Indonesian 
in 2005. This movement of capital back to the victims of the East Asian crisis shows a 
possible cycle as illustrated by Version II of the “Financial Model.” Therefore, if the 
countries return to excessive borrowing, the global society can expect a downturn in the 
flow of capital in developing nations and the possibility of currency turmoil. 
Modeling the East Asian crisis
For the purpose of replicating the East Asian crisis, there are 10 states in the 
model, which are 10 countries. Five states represent Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, 
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the Philippines, and Malaysia. From the data in Section IV, Thailand took approximately 
193 days to reach its lowest exchange rate. During this period, investors sold their Thai 
baht at incredible levels and fled the Thai market. Speculating that the same situation 
would happen in Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia, investors 
decided to sell securities and the currencies of those countries. After almost 200 days of 
falling exchange rate values, the countries began to see their currencies stabilize, as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.2 of Section IV. As a result, for the purpose of this model, it is 
assumed that investors no longer sold those currencies. 
Supposing that each generation is a day, the “Financial Model” can replicate this 
event using Version I of the model. To begin, the five first states representing the five 
affected countries have a larger number of investors compared to the other five states that 
represent the countries investors fled to, such as the U.S. and European nations. The 
following figure shows the output of using five informed investors, with a financial 
economic force of -0.200 against Thailand (state zero). 
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Figure 6.9: Herd Behavior and Contagion in the 1997 East Asian 
Crisis. Five informed investors, with a financial economic force of -0.200 
against Thailand.
Figure 6.9 is not intended to replicate Figure 4.2.The model is simply showing the actions 
of investors and their correlation to the fall of exchange rates. As the figure shows, the 
“Financial Model” has successfully replicated the general behavior of investors and 
countries before and during a currency crisis. When a couple of top investors decide to 
flee a stock or currency, many investors follow their lead. Due to similarities between 
nations, investors also decide to flee similar countries, producing contagion. Although the 
model differs in particular details to the real events, the interactions of cells replicate the 
same general conduct of herd behavior and contagion. 
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Section VII: Conclusion 
Currency crises and contagion are not new topics to nations, economists, and 
analysts. More than ever, we are aware of what they are, why they occur, and the way 
they manifest themselves and spread. There are many examples to learn from. We are 
aware of the consequences they have and we understand methods of prevention and 
containment. 
Currency crises are a result of currency flight: investors flee a currency in fear of 
devaluation. Fundamentally, poor macroeconomic policies and conditions are the reason 
for shifts in market expectations and confidence. There are also instances in which 
investors’ expectations and actions lead to changes in policy, creating self-fulfilling 
crises. To avoid currency devaluation, governments intervene in the currency market. In 
defense of the currency by the central bank, the government spends its foreign exchange 
reserves. In other times, crises start when there is a sudden withdrawal of short-term 
creditor loans, known as financial panic crises. Bubbles collapsing also set off crises.  
Crises often spillover across countries. A crisis can be transmitted across 
countries due to interdependence among market economies, similarities in 
macroeconomic policies and conditions, trade links, competitive devaluations, and 
financial links. The transmission of crises is largely attributed to the behavior of 
investors. Investors analyze the similar features between counties and decide whether to 
continue to invest in a country or withdraw their investment. Due to imperfect 
information, “herd behavior” is often common in the transmission of crises. Uninformed
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investors follow the actions of the informed investors and withdraw their money or place 
their money wherever they see an informed investor withdraw it or place it. 
There is empirical evidence demonstrating the existence of currency crisis 
contagion. This evidence includes comovements in exchange rates, stock prices, capital 
flows, and interest rates. The probability of a crisis occurring in a country increases if the 
economy shares a creditor with a crisis country. Further, the probability increases as the 
number of neighboring countries in crisis increases. 
We are also aware that there are ways to prevent and contain currency crises. 
They involve placing capital controls, greater supervision of banks, placing a tax on 
currency transactions, and temporarily suspending debt repayment. To contain a crisis 
and avoid the infection of a crisis into a country, economies can diversify their trade, 
float their currencies, and encourage domestic rather than foreign borrowing. 
The East Asian crisis is a good example of the causes of currency crises and their 
spread. The currency crises began in Thailand. Due to poor macroeconomic conditions, 
which included a large current account deficit, massive short-term capital inflows, poor 
banking supervision, and large borrowing by the government and corporations, foreign 
investors decided to sell the baht. The defense of the baht led to the depletion of 
Thailand’s foreign reserves and the inability of domestic borrowers to repay foreign 
loans, thus producing a currency and economic crisis in Thailand. The similarities 
between Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and the Philippines led investors to 
reconsider their investments in these nations causing the crisis to spread. Investors also 
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 saw similarities between the Asian economies and Russia and Brazil. As a result, they 
withdrew their investments from there as well.  
While macroeconomic indicators and measures give clear theoretical explanations 
of the causes and spreading of crises, news show the day to day impact on the people and 
the nations. In the case of Thailand, declining growth and signs of a downturn were 
present months before the fall of the baht. Consumption by Thais attracted large foreign 
investment, which led to a construction boom. But financial debt and lay-offs began 
surging, and economic growth declined significantly from the previous year. Changes in 
the government, such as the appointment of a new finance minister, and the decision to 
let the baht float hurt many domestic companies and increased the lay-offs. Borrowing 
costs immediately increased. The IMF and other developed economies stepped in, and 
Thailand was left with a devalued baht and $16 billion rescue package to pay back.  
However, the current situation of the foreign exchange market shows that after 
more than a decade, countries are still susceptible to currency crises. Capital flows along 
with volatile currency prices are making many countries prone to crises. The 2008 global 
financial crisis increased the flow of capital to developing nations, similar to the 1990s. 
Again, these emerging nations are struggling to manage the inflows of money, leaving 
the possibility of history repeating itself. 
Models, such as the one created in this thesis, can replicate previous crises, show 
the main factors driving such events, and suggest possible future events. The “Financial 
Model” successfully replicated herd behavior and the contagion phenomenon. In 
addition, the model demonstrates possible cycles in capital movements from developing 
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nations to developed nations and vice versa. These results correlate with the current 
events of capital movements and the struggles of the East Asian economies once again.    
If history is about to repeat, are we truly aware and know everything there is to 
know about currency crises? Before this thesis I was not informed about the subject of 
currency crises and contagion. The content of this thesis and what I have learned in the 
last 14 months came from reading many theoretical chapters on currency markets, 
economic research papers, and The Wall Street Journal. Extensive reading from The Wall 
Street Journal gave me a new lens on the global economy. Research papers showed me 
the diverse number of methods to model currency crises. The theoretical reading 
expanded my understanding of international economics. Now, I am able to understand 
and analyze the complex causes of financial crises, the influences of investors, and the 
similarities across countries. Overall, the thesis gave me a better understanding of the 
influence of international organizations, the power of government intervention, and the 
differences between theoretical economics and actual events.  
But now I question whether it is necessary for the common citizen to be aware of 
what truly causes these events. Will it make a difference? Economic crashes are being 
driven by investors as a reaction to government policies and actions and nations are still 
standing by shocked when a crisis occurs. News, reports, and analyses of these events are 
everywhere. Today more than ever international organizations and nations must come
together to finally find a solution to this problem. I believe there is an answer out there 
and it may be as simple as ensuring transparency, placing guidelines, and maintaining 
strong macroeconomic fundamentals.  
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